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ABSTRACT 
 
A Comparative Study of Housing Reconstruction After Two Major Earthquakes:  
The 1994 Northridge Earthquake in the United States and  
the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake in Taiwan. (August 2003)  
Jie Ying Wu, B.S., National Cheng Kung University; 
M.EN., National Taiwan University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael K. Lindell  
 
 
 
Though the idea of pre-impact recovery preparedness planning has recently been 
promoted by federal and state governments, very little research has been done to 
evaluate how it affects the process of disaster recovery. This research attempts to 
understand how pre-impact recovery planning affects housing reconstruction by 
examining the relationship of pre-impact recovery planning with housing reconstruction 
speed and the use of mitigation techniques during housing reconstruction. This study 
was conducted by comparing two cases, the City of Los Angeles, California and 
Taichung County in Taiwan.  
This study finds that having a pre-impact preparedness recovery plan increases the 
speed of housing reconstruction. The relationship between having a pre-impact recovery 
preparedness plan and the extent to which hazard mitigation is integrated into the 
recovery process is not very clear, but the experience of the City of Los Angeles 
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suggests that having a pre-impact recovery plan allows local officials to make more 
effective use of the “window of opportunity” after disaster. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Housing reconstruction after disaster is a major task in the disaster recovery phase. 
The immediate post-disaster period is obviously the time with immense potential for 
confusion, or at least the time for different stakeholders to take action that serves 
opposite or divergent purpose. The most obvious example is the conflict in recovery 
goals. Many local planning or redevelopment departments consider the rebuilding 
period to be an opportunity to implement urban renewal, but that takes time for 
coordination and negotiations. On the other hand, most of the victims hope to rebuild 
their housing as soon as possible. Major difficulties for the local government in the 
immediate post-disaster period include failure in recovery leadership (Rubin, 1985; 
Spangle Associates, 1997), ad hoc decision-making (Rubin, 1995), lack of preparation 
and poor coordination between departments (Rolfe and Britton, 1995). Also, existing 
recovery financing programs are not eligible for all classes of the victims (Comerio, 
1998; Bolin & Standford, 1998). 
Wilson (1991), Rolfe and Britton (1995), Geis (1996) and Milete (1999) suggested 
that pre-impact recovery planning is a powerful concept for more efficient and high 
quality decision-making as well as implementation. Pre-impact recovery  
________________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of American Planning Association. 
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planning helps local governments not only to design recovery procedures that include 
leadership and coordination mechanisms, but also helps to examine their own resources 
and integrate outside resources.   
Even though this idea of pre-impact recovery planning has recently been promoted 
by federal and state governments, very little research has been done to evaluate how it 
affects the process of disaster recovery. Does it actually accelerate the speed of housing 
reconstruction? Does it enhance hazard mitigation? Does it decrease the conflicts 
between short-term and long-term recovery goals? This dissertation has used two cases 
for a comparative study to understand how pre-impact recovery planning affects the 
housing reconstruction process. 
 
 
1.2 Organization of This Dissertation 
The following chapter presents the literature review for housing reconstruction after 
disaster. Chapter III presents the research hypotheses and research method of this study. 
Chapters IV and V present the housing reconstruction policies after the Northridge 
earthquake, and Chi-Chi earthquake. The final chapter of this dissertation presents a 
summary of the conclusions and offers suggestions for future research in this area. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALIZATION 
 
2.1 Concept of Recovery 
The term “recovery” is not very clear and sometimes it has been confused with 
some similar ones such as “reconstruction”, “ restoration”, and “rehabilitation”. 
Quarantelli (1999) concluded that “reconstruction” seemed to stress exclusively the 
post-impact rebuilding of physical structures destroyed or damaged in a disaster.  
“Restoration” appears to be a statement about reestablishing prior or pre-impact 
physical and social patterns. “Rehabilitation” seems to also suggest a restoration, 
although more of people than things. The term “recovery” has a broader scope, and it 
implies attempting to and/or bringing the post disaster situation to some level of 
acceptability. This might or might not be the same as the pre-impact level. 
Haas, Kates and Bowden (1977) in their book Reconstruction Following Disaster 
proposed four stages of the post-impact period associated with recovery: 1) emergency 
response involving debris removal, provision of temporary housing, and search and 
rescue, 2) restoration of public services (electricity, water, and telephone), 3) 
replacement or reconstruction of capital stock to pre-disaster levels, and 4) initiation of 
improvement and developmental reconstruction involving economic growth and 
development of the locale. Rubin (1985) later challenged this linear dynamic model 
because her data indicated that this four-stage model might be too simplistic. In fact, she 
found that many of these periods overlapped and different portions of a community 
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could be in different stages of the recovery period at the same time. In the decade 
following her research, researchers gradually moved beyond seeing recovery as 
physical reconstruction. Nigg (1995) considered that recovery should not be 
conceptualized only as an outcome, but rather as a social process that begins before a 
disaster occurs and encompasses decision-making concerning emergency response, 
restoration and reconstruction activities following the disaster.  
 
 
2.2 Pre-impact Planning for Post-disaster Recovery 
Pre-impact planning for post-disaster recovery has been minimal in the United 
States (Mileti, 1999), but it has become more common in the past decade. Recovery 
training courses and handbooks are provided by the United Nations (UN)1, the 
Organization of American States (OAS)2, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency’s (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute3, and state governments. 
Nonetheless, recovery planning is not a very common idea at the local level. Most 
communities, except some in California, Florida and North Carolina, are unprepared for 
the most basic challenges of disaster recovery such as restoration of infrastructure and 
                                                 
1
 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs coordinated a series of training courses 
regarding rehabilitation and reconstruction. For more information, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/index.html 
2
 The Organization of American States (OAS) promoted recovery planning after Hurricane Georges 
stroke the eastern Caribbean. For more information, http://www.oas.org/pgdm/  
3
 Emergency Management Institute, FEMA provides training courses such as course E-210: Recovery 
from Disaster, course E376 - State Public Assistance Operations etc. For more information 
http://www.fema.gov/emi 
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immediate housing needs (Petterson, 1999). So far, only Florida requires local plans for 
post-disaster recovery, and the mandate applies only in the coastal counties. 
Research focused on recovery planning also is very limited. Rubin (1985) provided 
a framework for local recovery developed from 14 case studies, and concluded that 
personal leadership, ability to act and knowing what to do are three necessary elements 
to ensure an efficient community recovery. She implied that these three elements could 
be regarded as recovery planning and implementation. Wilson (1991) in his study on the 
Loma Prieta earthquake emphasized that recovery planning should be an ongoing, 
organization-wide process that has the full support and involvement of the top officials. 
Schwab, Topping, Eadie, Deyle and Smith (1998) considered that the purpose of 
planning for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction is to provide a vision for decision 
makers and a framework within which decisions will be made. The plan can provide 
decision makers with some general guidance and principles that they should follow to 
achieve long-term recovery goals.  
Though it has not yet general widespread acceptance, the notion of pre-impact 
planning for post-disaster recovery is a powerful concept (Mileti, 1999). Planners like 
Mader, Spangle, and Blair offered suggestions regarding pre-impact actions that might 
ease the planning process that local governments would otherwise have to adopt and 
implement under great time pressure (Petterson, 1999). The political climate right after 
a disaster is obviously difficult for local public officials. Time is by far the most 
compelling factor influencing local government recovery decisions, actions and 
outcomes (Mileti, 1999). According to Wilson (1991), experienced local officials have 
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warned that if long-term recovery plans are not prepared in advance, there will not be 
time to consider how activities undertaken during the immediate response will affect 
long-term recovery. Similarly, Geis (1996) suggested that the more recovery issues can 
be thought through in advance, perhaps by means of disaster scenarios, the greater will 
be the efficiency and quality of post-impact decision-making.  
The Recovery Annex in the Federal Response Plan (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 1999), emphasizes that coordination and planning are key 
elements in recovery. It states, “ Before a disaster, interagency planning and 
coordination provide a foundation for strengthening relationships among Federal and 
State agencies, voluntary organizations, and private sector entities.”(p. RF-3). Because 
of the rarity of pre-impact recovery planning, only one study has been done to evaluate 
the effectiveness of such plans following disaster. Spangle Associates (1997) conducted 
research after the Northridge earthquake in the City of Los Angeles by interviewing 39 
local officials. The City of Los Angeles is unusual in that it had developed a long-term 
recovery and reconstruction plan before the earthquake. Spangle Associates found that, 
although few people actually referred to the plan after the earthquake, the process of 
preparing the plan was very helpful. Many local officials in Los Angeles mentioned that 
they knew what their responsibilities were and what needed to be done after the 
earthquake because they had resolved these issues during the planning process. Thus, 
the greatest benefit of this plan was not the written plan, but the planning process itself. 
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2.3 Housing Reconstruction 
One major component of community recovery is housing reconstruction. Quarantelli 
(1982) proposed four types (phases) of shelter and housing that comprise the housing 
recovery path after disaster: emergency shelter, temporary shelter, temporary housing 
and permanent housing. Emergency shelter is usually established after a disaster at the 
instigation of individuals and households based on chance availability, convenience, 
proximity, and perceived safety (Bolin, 1993 a). Temporary shelters often are 
established in mass care facilities or large public buildings that are managed by 
American Red Cross in the United States, or governmental agencies or non-
governmental charities organizations in other counties. In the United States, temporary 
housing aid is often provided by FEMA and primarily takes the form of cash grants for 
temporary housing rent until victims can reestablish permanent housing. In some 
instances, mobile homes are provided if existing rental stock in an area is not adequate 
to house disaster victims (Bolin, 1993 b). Pre-fabricated housing also has been used in 
Japan and Taiwan as temporary housing after severe earthquakes. The last stage of 
housing reconstruction is permanent housing, which can be rebuilt on the same site or 
another site after the disaster. FEMA provides individual assistance to victims by 
providing cash grants, and facilitating assistance from other federal agencies. This 
includes low-interest loans from Small Business Administration (SBA) and tax 
deductions from Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
Many factors contribute to a community’s capacity to successfully reconstruct 
housing after a disaster--economic conditions, the nature of the federal and state role, 
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the disaster management system, and the regulatory system of land use and building 
practices--but the most important factor is finance for housing repair (Comerio, 1998). 
When we focus on financial issues, there are two major approaches to housing 
reconstruction. One is simply to let the market place sort out the winners and losers 
after a disaster, providing government and charitable aid only in the emergency period. 
The other is to let insurance or government programs provide very limited assistance for 
victims (Comerio, 1998). In fact, most housing reconstruction cases involve a 
combination of these approaches. Comerio’s study of housing reconstruction after the 
Mexico City earthquake, the Northridge earthquake and the Kobe earthquake in Japan 
concluded that in developing counties, most of the funds come from international aid. In 
the developed countries, financing for recovery comes from domestic sources. These 
include national treasuries, taxes, and bonds in the public sector, and insurance and 
private borrowing in the private sector. Housing reconstruction cannot rely exclusively 
on market forces because of market failure, which is caused in part by a shortage of 
information for victims about where to get loans. This is especially true for ethnic 
minorities (Peacock et al., 1997). Therefore, recovery financing programs play a very 
important role in housing recovery.  
In the United States, FEMA, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) and the SBA are the main agencies providing recovery programs. As noted 
earlier, FEMA offers “relief” types of assistance such as temporary housing programs, 
additional living expense programs and minimum home repair program. However, 
HUD is the focus for housing supply assistance programs such as the Community 
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Development Block Grant program and the Home Investment Partnerships program, 
which provide block grants for construction of new, and renovation of existing 
affordable housing, through local governments (Comerio, 1998). HUD also provides 
Section 8 vouchers for low income renters after a disaster. SBA has many disaster loan 
programs to offer low-interest loans for households to repair or replace damaged homes 
and for businesses to repair structures or replace lost inventory. These recovery 
programs include the Home-Owner Disaster Loan Program, Renter Disaster Loan 
Program, and Individual Disaster Loan Program. Non-government organizations 
(NGOs) also play an important role in the short-term recovery phase. The American 
Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and other religious and charitable groups provide mass 
care (emergency shelter and food), financial grants, and assistance with rebuilding and 
repair of housing to the victims.  
In Taiwan, there was no existing disaster recovery program before the Chi-Chi 
earthquake except for natural disaster relief from the Ministry of Interior. After the Chi-
Chi earthquake, the central government established many recovery programs, but these 
programs are only available for Chi-Chi earthquake victims. These programs include 
low-interest loans, discount public housing, health insurance deductible waivers, and 
unemployment grants. NGOs also play a very important role in the disaster response 
and recovery phase. The Tzu-Chi Foundation, which is a religious group, not only gave 
relief to the victims right after the earthquake, but also contributed more than half of the 
total pre-fabricated housing during the disaster recovery phase. 
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2.4 Integrating Mitigation Policies into Recovery  
The recovery period is a unique time to enact mitigation policies. Hazard mitigation 
is advance action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to human life and 
property from hazards (Godschalk, Beatly, Berke, Brower and Kaiser, 1999). A range 
of mitigation measures can be incorporated to recovery, including improved building 
codes and construction standards, more effective land-use and community planning, and 
environmental management that reduces vulnerability (Berke & Beatley, 1997). These 
mitigation measures can be classified into three categories: community protection 
works, land use practices, and building construction practices (Lindell & Prater, in 
press). Community protection works include dams, levees, and drainage systems that 
protect an entire area from hazard impact. Land use practices include land use 
regulation (zoning), and comprehensive plans that limit the amount of property in 
vulnerable areas. Building construction practices include structural designs and 
construction materials that reduce the vulnerability of the structures that are located in 
the hazardous areas. 
Many have recognized that the time period immediately after impact is a “window 
of opportunity” (Kingdon, 1995) to enact mitigation policies, because policy makers 
can use a disaster as a “focusing event” that can be exploited to induce desired policy 
changes (Birkland, 1997). But the opening of the policy window does not automatically 
result in policy change. The public needs to pay attention to the problem, and have new 
groups participate in public debate on the mitigation issue in order to produce policy 
change (Prater & Lindell, 2000). Nor will the “window” remain open indefinitely. 
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Kingdon has offered five reasons for the closure of a policy window. First, the window 
may close without action if no policy options are available for action at the appropriate 
time. Second, action on the problem may be taken and the problem resolved. Third, 
attempts may be thwarted, leading to a decrease in attention and finally a shift in 
political resources to the other issues. Fourth, agency personnel may change and new 
personnel may be unwilling to back any proposed change. Finally, the events that 
caused the crisis eventually will fade from public awareness, allowing attention to shift 
to fresh issues. To take advantage of the “window of opportunity” that opens after a 
disaster, policy entrepreneurs must ensure that the window closes because of the second 
reason (action taken and the problem resolved). Development of a pre-impact recovery 
plan appears to be the best way to ensure that this happens. 
  
 
2.5 Developing Pre-impact Recovery Plans for Housing Reconstruction  
After reviewing recovery planning in three cities, Schwab et al. (1998) proposed 
that four basic functions be addressed in a community recovery plan: Organization and 
authority, short-term rehabilitative functions, land use, and regional coordination. 
Within these four functions, the following elements should be planned before disaster: 
1. Organization and authority: Select the members of the recovery task force, 
designate the lead agency, establish operations policy, set up an account system 
for disaster assistance, coordinate with the emergency manager, and institute 
public participation and hearings.   
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2. Short-term rehabilitative functions: Identify sites for temporary shelter and 
housing, identify sites for refuse disposal, establish a process for damage 
assessment, restore infrastructure, set policy for emergency building demolition, 
establish reconstruction priorities, set policies for reoccupancy permits, and set 
policy for emergency permitting. 
3. Land use: Review case studies to identify new lessons from damage assessment, 
identify nonconforming uses, review sites for emergency operations, replan 
stricken areas, review evacuation shelters, reevaluate road capacity for 
emergency access and evacuation, identify vulnerable historical structures, and 
prepare area-specific building moratoria. 
4. Regional coordination: Coordinate with federal and state agencies and 
neighborhood organizations, review contracts and mutual aid agreements with 
mass media, non-profit organizations and the private sector; and review 
emergency legislation. 
The Organization of American States (2001) proposed a somewhat similar program 
of pre-impact recovery planning for the islands in the Caribbean and recommended the 
following four categories of activities: 
1. Construction standards: Clarify the role of the Bureau of Standards, set up a 
committee with the public to agree upon standards for construction materials, 
and identify sources for these construction materials. 
2. Household preparation: Conduct workshops for householders on disaster 
resistant design and safe building construction practices. 
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3. Construction sector preparation: Make available and promote the adopted 
national building code, and promote good design though hardware supplies and 
contractors. 
4. Policy development: Formulate policy and regulations for leased land, maintain 
enforcement of zoning laws, and ensure all ministries and government 
organizations use the existing building standards. 
Comerio (1998) considered that an ideal disaster-rebuilding policy must minimize 
the potential for damage through serious and effective mitigation programs and, when 
damage occurs, link property owners to reliable sources of recovery capital.  
Combining the concepts above, a good pre-impact recovery plan establishes 
agreement about long-term recovery goals, lets the stakeholders know what are their 
roles, informs people where are the resources after the disaster, and makes use of the 
window of opportunity. A good pre-impact recovery plan also should have the 
following elements for housing reconstruction: 
1. Establish a recovery task force and leading agency, 
2. Identify the recovery financing programs for which different classes of residents 
are eligible, and 
3. Integrate mitigation policy into the recovery process. 
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CHAPTER III    
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Definition of Terms 
Apartment: A structure contains two or more housing units. Only one owner 
owns the entire structure.  
Condominium: A structure contains two or more housing units. Each housing 
units has its owner.  
Housing reconstruction: In this study, housing reconstruction refers to the 
procedure where damaged structures had been torn down and rebuilt.  
Multifamily housing: A structure contains two or more housing units. Usually 
multifamily housing refers to apartments and condominiums. 
Single-family housing: A structure is a separate building that either has open 
spaces on all sides or is separated from other structures by dividing walls that 
extend from ground to roof. Usually only one owner for a single-family housing 
unit. 
Window of opportunity: A period of time right after a major disaster that can be 
used to adopt new policies.  
 
 
3.2 Research Hypotheses 
As shown by the literature review, time pressure is the key issue that makes pre-
impact recovery planning so valuable. Theoretically, having a pre-impact recovery plan 
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will shorten the time needed for decision-making and enhance government agencies, 
knowledge of what resources they have, where the resources are located, and what they 
need to do after the disaster. But very little research has been done to see how pre-
impact recovery planning actually affects on housing reconstruction activities. To 
examine how pre-impact recovery planning affects housing reconstruction activities, 
this study will examine the following two hypotheses: 
H1: Having a pre-impact recovery planning will increase the speed of housing 
reconstruction. 
Pre-impact recovery planning will shorten decision-making time after disaster. 
Furthermore, pre-existing recovery financing programs will make it easier and 
quicker for victims to apply for reconstruction loans or grants.  
 
H2: Having a pre-impact recovery plan will increase the extent to which hazard 
mitigation is integrated into the recovery process. 
If mitigation is formulated as a long-term recovery goal during pre-impact recovery 
planning, it should increase the opportunity for integrating mitigation into housing 
reconstruction. One of the Kingdon’s (1995) explanations for closure of the window 
of opportunity is that policy change attempts may be thwarted, leading a decrease in 
attention and finally the political resource shift to the other issues. If mitigation has 
not been integrated into pre-impact recovery planning, it is likely to be overlooked 
due to time pressure after a disaster. 
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3.3 Study Design 
Because many research studies on housing recovery after earthquake have been 
done in the United States, it is logical to choose a community in the United States as 
one of the study sites. The main reason to choose Taiwan as a comparison country is 
that the Hazard Reduction & Recovery Center had conducted some research related to 
emergency management in Taiwan. Moreover, both the United States and Taiwan are in 
areas that are highly vulnerable to earthquake, and both have experienced serious 
property loss from this hazard in the recent past. The 1994 Northridge earthquake had a 
magnitude of 6.7 on the Richter scale, killed 57 persons, and caused more than 7,000 
injuries. It also caused about 20 billion USD in direct property losses. The 1999 Chi-Chi 
earthquake in Taiwan, also called the 921 earthquake, had a magnitude of 7.3 on the 
Richter scale, killed 2,417 people, and caused 11,305 injuries. The direct losses were 
estimated at 11.5 billion USD4. Both the Northridge earthquake and the Chi-Chi 
earthquake were the most destructive earthquakes in their respective countries in the 
past half-century (see Table 3-1). These two earthquakes provide a great opportunity to 
study how disaster recovery is implemented in these two counties. Therefore, this study 
will use City of Los Angeles in the US and Taichung County in Taiwan as case studies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 All amounts reported below have been converted to US dollars at the 1999 currency exchange 
of 1 USD = 32 NT.
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Table 3-1 Comparisons of Northridge Earthquake and Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 Northridge Earthquake Chi-Chi Earthquake 
Date January 17, 1994 September 21, 1999 
Magnitude 6.8 7.3 
People Killed  57 2,417 
People Injured >11,000 >7,000 
Damaged Buildings >51,000 >65,000 
 
 
The City of Los Angeles, California had a population of about 3.8 million and 
1,337,706 housing units (U.S. Census Bureau 2000). Over 65,000 housing units were 
completely destroyed or sustained substantial damage during the earthquake. As 
mentioned before, Los Angeles is an unusual city in that it had a long-term recovery and 
reconstruction plan done by the city government before the earthquake. Moreover, 
FEMA, HUD and SBA had existing recovery programs for victims.  
Taichung County, Taiwan had a population of about 1.5 million that suffered 1,194 
deaths and about 19,000 injuries during the earthquake. Of the 386,860 housing units at 
the time of earthquake, 18,608 collapsed and 18,771 were damaged. Before the Chi-Chi 
earthquake, Taichung County had no recovery plan. As noted earlier, the central 
government announced some relief and housing reconstruction loan programs 
immediately after the earthquake. Moreover, it also promulgated the “Working 
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Guideline for Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Planning”, but this was not published 
until November 9, 1999, nearly two months after the earthquake.  
The situation in these two jurisdictions before and after their earthquakes provides a 
good opportunity to examine the hypotheses of this study (See Table 3-2). The City of 
Los Angeles had a pre-impact recovery plan which included existing recovery programs 
at the federal and state government levels and programs integrating mitigation policy 
into the recovery process, By contrast, Taichung had no a pre-impact recovery planning 
and very few existing recovery programs. Therefore, the situations in both jurisdictions 
will help this study to examine the hypotheses. By comparing these two jurisdictions, 
this study will also examine the current concept of good pre-impact recovery planning 
on housing reconstruction. Of course, there are other differences between these two 
jurisdictions such as their political and government administration systems, and their 
economic situations that also could have affected the recovery process. Therefore, the 
nature of these differences will need to be considered in drawing any inferences about 
the role of pre-impact recovery planning. Moreover, it is likely that this comparative 
case study will identify many issue that need to be resolved in future research. 
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Table 3-2 Research Design 
Issue US-City of Los Angeles Taiwan- Taichung County Hypothesis 
Housing 
reconstruction 
speed 
• Had pre-impact 
recovery planning  
• Had pre-impact disaster 
recovery programs in 
Federal and State level 
• Had no pre-impact 
recovery plan 
• Had very few pre-
impact disaster 
recovery programs 
H1 
Mitigation 
Policy 
• Had pre-impact 
recovery and 
reconstruction plan 
• HUD’s pre-impact 
program integrated 
mitigation policy into 
the recovery process  
• Had no pre-impact 
recovery plan 
• Had only a few post-
impact programs 
integrated mitigation 
into the recovery 
process 
H2 
 
 
 
3.4 Research Method and Measures 
This study relied heavily mainly on qualitative analysis of documents reviews and 
depth interviews. The study using the interview data from Spangle Associates, which 
conducted interviews with 37 government officers from City of Los Angeles in 1995. 
These officials came from 11 different departments and city council. The 11 
departments are Department of Building and Safety, Department of Community 
Development, Industrial and Commercial Division, Community Redevelopment 
Agency, Housing Department, Planning Department, Police Department, Department of 
Public Works, (Chiquita Canyon Recycling Center, Earthquake Reconstruction 
Program), Department of Recreation and Parks, Department of Transportation, Office 
of the Chief Legislative Analyst, Office of the City Administrative and Mayor's Office. 
This study also conducted interviews with 22 Taiwanese government officers from 
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central and local level as well as 3 planners from consulting firms. The 22 interviewees 
including officers from 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Recovery Commission, Council 
for Economic Planning and Development, Ministry of Interior from the central 
government and Department of Building Regulation, Fire Department, Planning 
Department in the Taichung County. 
 The independent variable for both Hypothesis 1 and 2 is that the presence or 
absence of a pre-impact recovery plan will be measured by the criteria (elements) 
developed on the literature review. Specifically, plans and programs were examined to 
determine the extent to each jurisdiction had: 1) established agreement about long-term 
recovery goals, 2) established a task force and leading agency after a disaster, 3) let 
stakeholders know what are their roles, 4) identified the recovery financing programs 
for which different classes of residents were eligible, 5) Informed people immediately 
where recovery resources could be obtained after the disaster, and 6) made use of the 
window of opportunity by integrating mitigation policies into the recovery process. The 
primary data source were be the housing recovery-related documents and plans in the 
two jurisdictions. 
The dependent variable for Hypothesis 1 is the speed of housing reconstruction 
which was measured by the time that rebuilding permits were issued. The data were 
collected from official documents in the City of Los Angeles and Taichung County. 
Other data were gained through depth interviews with officers in the Department of 
Building and Regulation, Department of Public Works, and Offices of Emergency 
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Management, as well as articles in local newspapers such as the Los Angeles Times and 
Taipei Times. 
The dependent variable for Hypothesis 2 is the extent to which hazard mitigation is 
integrated into the recovery process. This dependent variable was measured by the 
extent to which hazard mitigation was implemented into housing recovery related 
policies such as disaster recovery programs, land use planning, and comprehensive 
planning. The primary data sources were official documents from different levels of 
governments. Data also were collected through depth interviews with officers in the 
Planning Departments, Departments of Community Development, and Building 
Departments. 
 
 
  
22
CHAPTER IV 
HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING  
THE 1994 NORTHRIDGE EARTHQUAKE 
 
4.1 The Earthquake and City of Los Angeles 
The Northridge earthquake struck the Los Angeles area at 4:31AM on January 17, 
1994, with a magnitude of 6.7 on the Richter scale. The epicenter was in the San 
Fernando Valley (see Figure 4-1), a densely populated residential area northwest of 
downtown Los Angeles. Three counties were affected, Los Angeles, Ventura, and 
Orange, with 57 persons were killed and more than 7,000 injured. Perkins, Boatwright, 
Chuaqui and Harrald (1995) reported that 13,575 severely damaged buildings (red 
tagged) and 37,711 moderately damaged buildings (yellow tagged5). Direct loss was 
estimated at least $25 billion (OES, 1997). The Northridge earthquake prompted the 
largest federal disaster expenditure in the U.S. history, more than $12 billion in grants 
and loans (FEMA, 1996).  
 Los Angeles County, with nearly 9.5 million people, has the largest population of 
any county in the U.S. The City of Los Angeles alone has a population of about 3.7 
million (Census Data, 2000). The economic structure is 19.1% industry and 60.9% 
service (City of Los Angeles, 2003). Average household income is about $38,000 
(Census Data, 2000).  After the earthquake, 75,741 buildings (409,901 units) were 
inspected in the City of Los Angeles about 77% of the units were multifamily dwellings 
                                                 
5
 Red tag means the building was rendered entirely uninhabitable.  Yellow tag means the  
building needed further evaluation. Green tag means the building had experienced  
nonstructural damage and remained habitable. 
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and 23% were single-family dwellings6 (OES, 1995). Ninety percent of the 
earthquake’s damage was concentrated in the San Fernando Valley (OES, 1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: USGS and Los Angeles Almanac 
Figure 4-1 The Epicenter of the Northridge Earthquake  
                                                 
6
  If classified by structure, not unit, the percentages of multifamily and single-family are  
about 25% and 75% respectively. 
Epicenter 
City 
Boundary  
Epicenter 
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4.2 Conditions at the Time of Northridge Earthquake 
The Northridge earthquake struck an area of the United States generally considered 
to be the best prepared to cope with a disaster, particularly a seismic event (EERI, 
1995), because Los Angeles had experienced the Whittier Narrows earthquake in 1987 
and was proactive in training each department to deal with a large disaster. In addition, 
the city had participated in response training after the Loma Prieta earthquake and took 
part in the Joint Symposium on Earthquake Hazard Management in the Urban Area 
(Comerio, Landis & Firpo, 1996). 
As noted earlier, the City of Los Angeles was unusual in that it had a long-term 
recovery and reconstruction plan drafted before the Northridge earthquake called the 
Los Angeles Recovery and Reconstruction Plan (R&R Plan). This plan was a project of 
the Recovery and Reconstruction Division (R&R Division) of Los Angeles’ Emergency 
Operations Organization (EOO), which launched an innovative planning process for 
post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction in 1987. This planning process involved 
representatives from academic fields as well as a number of city departments and took 
quite some time. At the time of the Northridge earthquake, the R&R plan was on the 
agenda of the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) for approval and was adopted five 
days after the earthquake. 
The Northridge earthquake emerged as a focal point of political discourse and 
became an arena in which claims of disaster needs were publicly promoted at both the 
state and national level (Bolin & Standford, 1998). Since the Northridge earthquake 
occurred during the congressional election year, politicians at the federal and state level 
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immediately converged on the impact areas. The policies announced later had many 
political implications, especially for Democratic President Clinton and Republican 
Governor Wilson. President Clinton was the first Democratic president to carry 
California in a national election in 28 years. The response and recovery for this 
earthquake provided the impetus for his re-election in 1996 as well as for congressional 
candidates that year (Bolin & Standford, 1998). Clinton immediately declared the 
Northridge earthquake a national disaster on the afternoon of 17 January, resulting in a 
very rapid mobilization at the federal level. FEMA Director James Witt, Transportation 
Department Secretary Federico Pena, and HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros all arrived in 
Los Angeles by the evening of the first day. On 19 January, Secretary Pena committed 
to 100% federal coverage of repairs to interstate highways for six months without the 
usual requirement of 25% matching state funds. Secretary Cisneros also immediately 
disbursed $129 million in Community Development Block Grants to the region as well 
as 20,000 Section 8 housing certificates for low-income victims without preliminary 
loss estimates (Bolin & Standford, 1998). On 20 January, Governor Wilson requested 
that the federal committee provide 100% coverage for the Individual and Family Grant 
Program and the reconstruction costs for public buildings and highways without 25% 
matching state funds, but the federal government contributed only 90%.   
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4.3 Post-disaster Recovery Programs After the Earthquake 
Some recovery financial programs from the federal government and a few from 
local government were available for housing reconstruction after the Northridge 
earthquake. Most of these assistance programs had been instituted before the 
earthquake. These programs were (also see Table 4-1): 
1. Temporary Housing Program 
FEMA provided grants for housing rental assistance of $1,150 per month. 
Owners received this grant for three month, but it could be extended for 18 
months. Renters could receive this grant for only two months. About 119,000 
victims received this grant (FEMA, 1995). 
2. Additional Living Expense Program 
FEMA offered mortgage and rental assistance for victims who were unemployed 
as a result of the earthquake to prevent foreclosure or eviction. FEMA paid the 
actual amount of the mortgage or rent for up to 18 months or until new 
employment was found, whichever came first. There were only about 1,000 
applications for this program (FEMA, 1995). 
3. Minimum Home Repair Program (MHRP)  
Homeowners whose dwellings sustained less than $10,000 in damage7 were 
eligible for FEMA’S Minimum Home Repair Program. This program assisted 
victims to restore their homes to a livable condition. FEMA (1996) distributed  
                                                 
7
 The damage was determined by a FEMA inspector. 
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Table 4-1 Summary of Post-disaster Recovery Program after Northridge Earthquake  
Program  Agency  Target Population  Funding or Time Limits  
Temporary Housing Program  Federal Emergency Management 
Agency  
Short-term rental. Assistance to 
displaced renters  
3 months rental for owners and 2 
months rental for renters  
Additional Living Expense 
Program  
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency  
Rental and/or mortgage assistance 
to displace owners  
18 months rent and mortgage 
assistance  
Minimum Home Repair 
Program (MHRP)  
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency  
Homeowners with damage less than 
$10,000  
Average $2,900  
Individual and Family Grant 
(IFG)  
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, State Disaster Response 
service. 90/10 match  
Homeowners and renters covering 
replacement of real & personal 
property  
$12,200  
Section 8 Rental Vouchers  U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development  
Low income renters  18 months (with possible extension)  
Earthquake Emergency Loan 
Program (EELP) through 
Community Development 
Block Grant (CDBG) and 
HOME  
LA Housing Department and U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban 
Development  - - 
Assistance Loans for Homes & 
Personal Property  
U.S. Small Business Administration Homeowners or renters with 
damage  
Loan Maximum $200,000 for real 
property and $40,000 for personnel 
property  
Physical Disaster Business 
Loans  
U.S. Small Business Administration Damaged business  Loan Maximum 1.5 million depending 
on ability to repay the loan  
Tax: Disaster Assistance 
Program  
U.S. Department of Treasury  All victims  Income tax deductions for the losses  
Rehousing Grants  City of Los Angeles  Victims with damaged hosuing  $500  
 
Source: Comerio, et al.. Post-Disaster Residential Rebuilding, 1994.  
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about $841 million in MHRP grants to 288,000 homeowners with an average 
amount of $2,900. 
4. Individual and Family Grant Program (IFG) 
Victims who were not eligible for other federal assistance programs could 
receive aid from the IFG Program for home repairs. Originally this was a 
FEMA-State joint program which required 25% matching funds from the state 
government. As mentioned earlier, FEMA eventually provided 90%. The 
maximum IFG payout was $12,200. 
5. Section 8 Rental Vouchers Program 
HUD’s Section 8 Rental Vouchers program offered rental assistance for 
households of qualified victims with income less than 50% of the US median. 
This rental assistance was good for 18 months, but could be extended. With 
Section 8 Vouchers, victims could rent any HUD- approved apartment. The 
federal government then paid the difference between 30% of the household’s 
gross income and the rental amount. 
6. Community Development Block Grants (CDBGs) and Affordable Housing 
Program (HOME) Grants 
HUD’s CDBGs were given to city or county governments for develop 
reconstruction and development programs. HOME grants supported construction 
of multi-family residences and provided mortgage assistance for low income 
victims. The City of Los Angeles received $321 million in grants from HUD 
after the earthquake.  
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7. Assistance Loans for Homes and Personal Property 
The SBA offered low-interest loans to individuals for housing reconstruction. 
These loans covered non-insured losses on the home (real property) as well as 
personal property. The maximum loans for real property and personal property 
were $200,000 and $40,000, respectively. Both homeowners and renters could 
apply for personal property loans, but renters were not eligible for property 
loans. Home loans were typically issued to middle and higher income owners 
with good credit ratings. However; only about half of the 194,000 applicants 
received loans (Bolin & Standford, 1998).    
8. Physical Disaster Loan  
HUD provided low-interest loans up to $1.5 million to business and rental 
property owners. 
9. Tax Disaster Assistance Program 
The IRS allowed certain casualty losses to be deducted on Federal income tax 
returns for the year of the loss or through an immediate amendment to the 
previous year's return. 
10. Rehousing Grants 
The City of Los Angeles Housing Department provided $500 rehousing grants 
for victims within five days after the earthquake.  
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4.4 Factors That Influenced Housing Reconstruction 
As noted earlier, many factors contribute to a community’s capacity to successfully 
reconstruct housing after a disaster--These include previous disaster experience, 
economic conditions, the roles of different levels of government, the disaster 
management system, and the regulatory system of land use and building practices, but 
finance is the most important factor (Comerio, 1998). Moreover, the factors mentioned 
above are interactive rather than independent of each other. For example, experience 
gained from the riots of 1992 raised key housing reconstruction problems and 
reinforced the disaster management system in the City of Los Angeles, the economic 
situation influenced victims’ choice of rebuilding housing or moving to other places, 
and the roles of federal and state government influenced the allocation of reconstruction 
funding. 
The financial resources for housing reconstruction can be classified into two 
categories: private sources such as personal savings, loans, and insurance and public 
sources such as SBA loans, FEMA grants, and HUD grants. According to  data from the 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), the savings rate in the US for the 
period from 1994 to 1997 was in the range of 2%-7%. A savings rate this low suggests 
that personal savings could not provide a major source for housing reconstruction. 
Indeed, data provided by the U.S. Office of Management and the Budget, the 
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, and the California Department of Insurance 
indicated that private insurers paid out almost 65.3% of the major housing 
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reconstruction funds after the Northridge earthquake. SBA loans contributed another 
20.7%, and FEMA and HUD grants contributed 7% each. (See Figure 4-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Funding Sources for Housing Reconstruction after the  
Northridge Earthquake 
 
Funding  
Sources 
Private 
Public 
Personal Saving (very small) 
Insurance (65.3%) 
SBA (20.7%): Low Interest Loan 
FEMA (7%) 
Minimal Home Repair (MHR) 
Individual/ Family Grant (IFG) 
HUD (7%) 
HOME 
Community Development Block 
Grant (CDBG) 
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4.5 The Recovery and Reconstruction Plan and Housing Reconstruction 
 The overall concept of the R&R Plan was to develop planning and action before a 
disaster to significantly reduce recovery and reconstruction costs, hasten a return to 
normalcy, and create an improved city afterwards (City of Los Angeles, 1994). Four 
themes are central to this plan: planning; hazard mitigation; short-term recovery; long-
term reconstruction. The R&R Plan contained policy statements with about 300 
implementing actions organized into eight topical groups: residential, commercial and 
industrial rehabilitation; public sector service; economic recovery; land use/re-use; 
organization and authority; psychological rehabilitation; vital records; and inter-
jurisdictional relationships. These implementing actions were divided into pre- and 
post-event actions. Lead responsibility for each action was assigned to one or more 
departments or agencies within the Los Angeles city government.       
At the time of the earthquake, Los Angeles had a new mayor and a new planning 
director who were either unaware of, or not familiar with the R&R Plan. Since the 
leadership didn’t emphasize this plan, many departments forgot that it existed during 
their operation after the Northridge earthquake. Spangle Associates conducted 20 
interviews with 39 staff members from 11 different departments and the city council in 
1995 and reported that less than half of the interviewees knew of the R&R plan at the 
time of earthquake.  
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the R&R Plan had no effect on housing 
recovery. Many representatives from departments that participated in the R&R planning 
process had changed their departmental plans and, therefore, knew what their 
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responsibilities were and what they needed to do right after the earthquake even though 
they were unaware of the R&R Plan itself. Moreover, many departments had deployed 
recovery preparedness checklists that could accelerate the speed of housing 
reconstruction. For example, the Department of Building and Safety and the 
Department of Public Works had developed streamlined procedures for demolition 
before the earthquake. Before the earthquake, the Housing Department and the 
Community Development Department had set up similar policies to expedite building 
permits. According to the interviews data, this study found that these recovery 
preparedness policies did speed up housing reconstruction (See Table 4-2). These 
recovery preparedness policies were also integrated with pre-existing federal recovery 
programs such as SBA loans and FEMA and HUD grants. For example, the Housing 
Department staff knew the federal loan process and developed local loan guidelines and 
procedures that were compatible with federal requirements. Besides federal loans and 
grants, Los Angeles also had acted before the Northridge earthquake to establish a city 
loan program that provided a $500 rehousing grant. 
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Table 4-2 Actions That Each Department Took to Increase the Speed of Housing 
Reconstruction 
Department Actions Increasing the Speed of Housing Reconstruction 
Building and Safety • Establish criteria for emergency demolition contracts 
• Establish due process and procedures for demolition 
• Prepare pre-incident agreements 
• Set up a damage assessment system  
• Expedite building permits 
• Establish one-stop processing 
• Create parcel data base 
Community 
Redevelopment 
• Review and revise qualifying criteria for the city's 
neighborhood revitalization tools  
• Streamline procedures for redevelopment area 
expansions or additions 
Housing • Prepare emergency regulations 
• Identify staff in other departments who understand loan 
processing 
• Have procedures to adopt emergency regulations 
• Develop loan guidelines and procedures 
• Obtain pre-approval on loan procedure from federal 
agencies 
• Develop and implement city loan program 
• Identify available housing 
Planning • Update procedures to expedite permits 
• Insure consistency of R & R Plan with Safety Element 
• Prepare procedures, forms, list of R & R Division 
members 
• Determine criteria for balancing post-event work 
priorities 
Emergency Operations 
Board 
• Request formation of ad hoc committee on R & R, assist 
utilities in restoration, initiate demolition and debris 
removal program. 
Chief Legislative Analyst • Lobby for and support National Earthquake Insurance 
Program 
Sources: Recovery and Reconstruction Plan, City of Los Angeles, California, 1994. 
Interview data, Spangle Associates, 1995. 
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4.6 Housing Reconstruction Speed 
Among the 19,229 approvals of housing rebuilding permits by the LA Building and 
Safety Department at the end of November 1996, 95.69% were single-family buildings, 
1.63% were apartment buildings, and 1.16% were Condominiums. In terms of the 
damaged dwelling units, 77% were apartments and condominiums and 23% were 
single-family dwellings. Table 4-3 and Figure 4-3 show that the peak period of housing 
reconstruction was between March and August 1994, about three to seven months after 
the earthquake. The peak month was April 1994.  
Figure 4-3 also shows that the speed of apartment and condominium reconstruction 
was slower than single-family buildings and didn’t have a specific peak period.  The 
City of Los Angeles faced a unique problem with areas of concentrated damage 
buildings scattered across the city after the earthquake. Thirty-eight census tracts out of 
756 in the city had at least 100 vacated residential units, representing 12% of the 
housing stock, but two-thirds of the vacated housing in the city (Stallings, 1996). The 
LA Housing Department referred to the 17 most heavily damaged neighborhoods as 
“ghost towns”. which were composed mostly of rental apartments and condominiums 
having owners who could not afford to rebuild or repair the abandoned structures. Many 
owners of large apartment buildings were in poor financial straits before the earthquake, 
so, the combination of high vacancies and declining property values caused by the 
Southern California recession meant that they had insufficient cash flow and 
insufficient equity to assume additional debt (Comerio, 1995). Most of the apartment 
owners could not receive SBA loans because of their inability to repay. The City of Los 
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Angeles identified this problem and petitioned HUD for special allocations from CDBG 
and HOME. Condominium reconstruction was different from apartment reconstruction, 
because many condominium owners had moderate incomes, were elderly, and had no 
earthquake insurance (Los Angeles Housing Department, 1995). The ownership pattern 
in which households owned individual units and the Home Owners’ Association (HOAs) 
owned the building and the grounds complicated funding for repair or reconstruction, as 
FEMA aid applied only to the individual owner or renter, not the association (Bolin & 
Standford, 1998). This condition led the HOAs to increase the HOA fee to fund repairs 
or reconstruction8.  Some owners could not afford to pay high fee and found it to their 
advantage to abandon their units. To prevent abandonment, the SBA developed a 
special program for HOAs and individual condominium owners, but required that 
HOAs would guarantee payment on the loan for unoccupied units. Thus, some still were 
not eligible for the loan under such a requirement. To solve this problem, the LA 
Housing Department, with HUD funding, developed another program for those who 
were denied by the SBA.  
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 In many cases, the HOA charged fee of at least $10,000 per household to pay the insure deductible (if 
applicable) or to pay for repairs.  
Table 4-3 Rebuilding Permits Issued in City of Los Angeles  
All Buildings  Single Family Buildings  Apartment Buildings  Condominium Buildings  
Issued Data  Cases  %  Cases  %  Cases  %  Cases  %  
Jan-94  3  0.02 1 0.01 2  0.64 0 0.00 
Feb-94  579  3.01 564 3.07 12  3.83 1 0.45 
Mar-94  1885  9.80 1853 10.07 11  3.51 8 3.57 
Apr-94  2195  11.42 2160 11.74 18  5.75 13 5.80 
May-94  2153  11.20 2094 11.38 21  6.71 25 11.16 
Jun-94  1890  9.83 1868 10.15 13  4.15 7 3.13 
Jul-94  1623  8.44 1608 8.74 11  3.51 5 2.23 
Aug-94  1554  8.08 1529 8.31 15  4.79 5 2.23 
Sep-94  1261  6.56 1229 6.68 17  5.43 10 4.46 
Oct-94  907  4.72 884 4.80 14  4.47 4 1.79 
Nov-94  741  3.85 716 3.89 9  2.88 10 4.46 
Dec-94  665  3.46 643 3.49 10  3.19 9 4.02 
Jan-95  318  1.65 305 1.66 9  2.88 3 1.34 
Feb-95  319  1.66 203 1.10 9  2.88 5 2.23 
Mar-95  393  2.04 366 1.99 16  5.11 12 5.36 
Apr-95  301  1.57 283 1.54 9  2.88 6 2.68 
May-95  485  2.52 457 2.48 9  2.88 18 8.04 
Jun-95  360  1.87 242 1.32 9  2.88 4 1.79 
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Table 4-3 (Continued)  
All Buildings  Single Family Buildings  Apartment Buildings  Condominium Buildings  
Issued Data  Cases  %  Cases  %  Cases  %  Cases  %  
Jul-95  227  1.18 185 1.01 13  4.15 22 9.82 
Aug-95  205  1.07 178 0.97 9  2.88 17 7.59 
Sep-95  135  0.70 124 0.67 5  1.60 5 2.23 
Oct-95  140  0.73 115 0.62 13  4.15 10 4.46 
Nov-95  120  0.62 96 0.52 14  4.47 9 4.02 
Dec-95  71  0.37 65 0.35 4  1.28 1 0.45 
Jan-96  85  0.44 75 0.41 7  2.24 2 0.89 
Feb-96  66  0.34 57 0.31 4  1.28 4 1.79 
Mar-96  84  0.44 77 0.42 4  1.28 2 0.89 
Apr-96  79  0.41 75 0.41 4  1.28 1 0.45 
May-96  84  0.44 79 0.43 5  1.60 0 0.00 
Jun-96  96  0.50 86 0.47 6  1.92 2 0.89 
Jul-96  55  0.29 51 0.28 2  0.64 1 0.45 
Aug-96  50  0.26 46 0.25 3  0.96 0 0.00 
Sep-96  27  0.14 23 0.12 3  0.96 0 0.00 
Oct-96  38  0.20 35 0.19 2  0.64 0 0.00 
Nov-96  35  0.18 29 0.16 1  0.32 3 1.34 
Total  19229  100 18401 100 313  100 224 100 
 
Source: Department of Housing and Safety, City of Los Angeles  
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 Figure 4-3 Percentage of Rebuilding Permits Issued in the City of Los Angeles  
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4.7 Mitigation Issues in Housing Reconstruction 
The State of California is a leader in pre-disaster mitigation. Under a program 
authorized by Proposition 122, the Earthquake Safety and Public Buildings 
Rehabilitation Fund of 1990, the state legislature was able to offer $250 million for the 
financing of seismic retrofitting, reconstruction, repair, replacement, or relocation of 
state buildings or facilities and another $50 million in matching funds to help localities 
retrofit public buildings. The City of Los Angeles established the Mayor's Blue Ribbon 
panel on Seismic Hazard Reduction in 1993 to identify seismic risks and promote 
voluntary and mandatory retrofitting. The panel is comprised of five subcommittees: 
Buildings, Structures, and Lifelines; Seismic Risk; Land Use and Construction; 
Insurance, Banking, and Real Estate; and Educational Programs and Outreach.  
Right after the Northridge earthquake, the city council passed an ordinance that required 
the retrofit of tilt-ups during the “window of opportunity.” This ordinance was drafted 
by the LA Department of Building and Safety and ready to submit before the 
earthquake. The department also established a task force right after the earthquake to 
learn the reasons for structural failures and recommend mitigation actions. 
Some of the existing federal recovery finance programs also integrated mitigation 
policies. HUD’s Community Development Block Grant program, which provides aid to 
communities for a wide range of community development activities, can be used for 
disaster recovery projects with mitigation implications. HUD regulations promote the 
safety and soundness of all public and HUD-insured housing by requiring these 
structures meet the Minimum Property Standards (MPS) established by the Department.  
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The MPS has different standard for multifamily housings and one or two units of 
dwellings. These standards are more stringent than many local code standards. The 
FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program provides grants to states and local 
governments to implement long-term hazard mitigation measures after a major disaster 
declaration. Individual homeowners and businesses may not apply directly to the 
program, but a community may apply on their behalf. After the Northridge earthquake, 
HMGP was mostly used for public buildings such as hospitals and classrooms. Very 
few grants were applied for on behalf of households and businesses. HUD‘s Office of 
Policy Development and Research (1995) conducted an earthquake mitigation report 
after the Northridge earthquake, which concluded that federal mitigation resources were 
mismatched with the needs. Almost 80% of the damaged residential units were 
multifamily housing and low-cost rental housing was particularly affected, but recovery 
programs were designed to serve middle-class owners of single-family housings. 
Moreover, it also found that most existing mitigation programs and resources were 
designed to address structural mitigation needs. The authors concluded that lack of 
attention to nonstructural mitigation methods might be the greatest threat to the safety 
of Los Angeles area residents. 
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CHAPTER V 
HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION FOLLOWING  
THE 1999 CHI-CHI EARTHQUAKE 
 
 
5.1 The Earthquake and Taichung County 
The Chi-Chi earthquake occurred at 1:47AM on September 21, 1999, so it is also 
called the 921 earthquake. The magnitude of the Chi-Chi earthquake was 7.3 on the 
Richter scale and its epicenter was in the center of Taiwan, about 50 miles from 
Taichung County (see Figure 5-1). This was the most destructive earthquake in the past 
half-century in Taiwan, killing 2,417 people and causing 11,305 serious injuries in the 
entire nation. The earthquake also damaged more than 51,000 buildings nationwide 
(The 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Recovery Commission, 2003). According to the 
2000 data from the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, the 
overall financial loss caused by the Chi-Chi earthquake was about 11.5 billion USD.  
Taichung County is located in the center of Taiwan with population about 1.5 
million people (Taichung County, 2002). The economic structure of Taichung County is 
48% industry and 44.1% service (Taichung County Fire Department, 1999). Because 
the earthquake’s epicenter was not in the Taichung County9, Taichung County didn’t 
receive much support from the central government and private sector in the first two 
days after the earthquake. The earthquake killed 1,194 people and injured about 19,000 
others in Taichung County; 18,608 buildings totally collapsed and another 18,771 
                                                 
9Due lack of communication, resources were initially sent to Nantou county, which was the site  
of  the earthquake epicenter.
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buildings were damaged (Taichung County Fire Department, 1999). The 21 Townships 
within Taichung County were all in the impact area. Eight Townships, Feng-Yuan, 
Tueng-Sh, Shin-Shou, Shih-Kang, Ho-Ping, Da-Li, Tai-Ping and Wu-Feng were the 
more seriously impacted areas (see Figure 5-2) that developed post-disaster recovery 
plans after the earthquake (Taichung County Fire Department, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-1 The Epicenter of Chi-Chi Earthquake 
Taichung county 
Boundary 
 
Figure 5-2 The Seriously Impacted Townships in Taichung County  
44 
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5.2 Conditions at the Time of the Chi-Chi Earthquake 
Taiwan is a highly centralized state in which the central government has a standard 
building code and standard urban planning procedures for the entire nation, but each 
jurisdiction may add regulations to fit its own needs. Because the entire island of 
Taiwan is vulnerable to earthquakes, the central government had developed a very strict 
building code, but construction practices are very critical. Some constructors skimped 
on work and stinted on material which made the buildings weaker than originally 
designed.  
The disaster management system in Taiwan is very different from the US. The basic 
difference is that, in Taiwan, different agencies take care of different type of disasters. 
For example, the Ministry of Interior is responsible for the earthquakes and typhoons; 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for floods; and the Council for 
Agriculture is responsible for debris flows. The Central Hazard Mitigation Council 
(CHMC) is the organization that coordinates disaster management policies at the central 
government level. The chair of CHMC is the deputy prime minister and council 
members are ministers from different agencies. Because the CHMC is not an 
organization in daily operation and its supporting staff mainly works for the National 
Fire Administration under the Ministry of Interior, the CHMC doesn’t function very 
actively when there are no disasters.  In spite of its name, the CHMC was more oriented 
toward the disaster preparedness and response function than toward the hazard 
mitigation function because of the backgrounds of its staff members. Local 
governments had  similar structures but a more difficult situation than the central 
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government (see Figure 5-3). This management system was proposed three years before 
the Chi-Chi earthquake, but most of the agencies at all level of governments except the 
fire departments were not familiar with this system.  
Since it had been more than 50 years since Taiwan had had a catastrophic 
earthquake, all levels of government lacked experience with post-earthquake housing 
reconstruction and none had a pre-disaster recovery preparedness plan. During the 
recovery phase, local governments relied greatly on the central government. Almost all 
the recovery-related policies and relief programs came from the central government. 
Because of the complicated recovery, the central government established a new 
specialized agency called the 921 Earthquake Post-disaster Recovery Commission, but 
this was not done until nine months after the earthquake10. 
                                                 
10
 In the first nine months, similar task forces (not specialized agency) were also organized by the central 
government. 
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Figure 5-3 Emergency Management System in Taiwan 
 
 
5.3 Post-disaster Recovery Programs After the Earthquake 
Because Taiwan is a highly centralized state, most of the local governments except 
Taipei City need the central government’s grants to construct infrastructure or promote 
welfare policies during normal times, not to mention during the post-disaster recovery 
period. In the recovery phase, the central government developed a series of programs to 
help victims by giving relief and grants or offering work opportunities, etc. These 
programs were intended only for the Chi-Chi earthquake victims and were announced a 
few days to two months after the earthquake. Some of these programs were criticized 
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for being too crude and not consistent due to the pressures of being so quickly 
organized. These programs were (also see Table 5-1): 
1. Relief for Death and Injured  
After the 921 earthquake, the vice president raised the relief compensation to 
USD 31,250 (NT 1,000,000) for the dead and missing and USD 6,250 (NT 
200,000) for the serious injured. Before the earthquake, the monetary relief for 
people who died or were serious injured caused by natural disaster was USD 
6,250 (NT 200,000) and about USD 3,125  (NT 100,000) respectively. It is 
widely believed that the policy change was due to the presidential election 
scheduled for the next March because the Vice President at that time was a 
presidential candidate. 
2. Housing Collapse Relief 
For completely collapsed buildings, each household11 received USD 6,250 (NT 
200,000). For the partially collapsed buildings, victims received USD 3,125 (NT 
100,000). The neighborhood commissioners were responsible for investigating 
the housing’s collapse status and obtaining approval from the township 
government. In case of controversy, professional engineers would accompany 
the neighborhood commissioners to double check. The policy of having 
neighborhood commissioners investigate the collapsed buildings was unwise, 
because few of the neighborhood commissioners had a professional background 
in building construction. As a result, more damaged buildings were declared as  
                                                 
11
 Only for those owners who lived in their houses when the earthquake struck. 
Table 5-1 Summary of Post-disaster Recovery Program after Chi-Chi Earthquake  
Program  Agency  Target Population  Funding or Time Limits  
Death and Injured Relief  Ministry of Interior  Death or Injured victims  $31,000 for death relief and $6,200 for serious 
injured relief  
Housing Collapse Relief  Ministry of Interior  Households with collapsed housing  $6,200 for totally collapsed building and $3,100 
for partially collapsed building  
Temporary Housing  Ministry of Interior  Households with collapsed housing 
and don’t apply for housing rent 
relief  
Move in the temporary housing for free  
Housing Rent Relief  Ministry of Interior  Households with collapsed housing 
and don’t apply for Housing rent 
relief  
$90 per person per month up to 2 years  
Public Housing Selling  Ministry of Interior  Households with collapsed housing  Buy public housing with 30% off  
Employment Service  Council for Labor  Households with collapsed housing 
or family member was death caused 
by earthquake  
Temporary working for government for 3 month. 
The wage is $500 per month. The employer can 
get $145 per month of subside up for 12 months if 
hiring a victim  
Medicare Care Service  Department of Health  Victims received injured relief or 
housing collapse relief  
Waive health insurance premium and deductible 
for 6 months  
Tax Deduction and Exempt  Ministry of Finance  All victims  Income tax deductions for the losses caused by the 
earthquak. Waive land tax and housing tax for one 
year for the owners with collapsed buildings  
Housing Reconstruction Loan  Central Bank  All victims with mortgage  No interest or low interest loan  
Mandatory Military Service 
Waive  
Ministry of Defense  Mandatory soldiers/ those going to 
mandatory service whose family 
member died caused by earthquake 
or his housing was totally collapsed  
Discharge from military service/ waive 2 year 
mandatory service but need to serve as national 
guard for 3 months  
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totally collapsed than should have been because the neighborhood 
commissioners were running for election.    
3. Temporary Housing (Prefabricated Housing) 
The government constructed about 15% of the prefabricated housing provided at 
no cost as temporary housing for victims. The private sector donated about 65% 
of the prefabricated housing. The Japanese government donated the remaining 
20% of the temporary housing, which consisted of container houses that had 
been used after the Kobe earthquake. Victims from collapsed buildings could 
apply for temporary housing if they didn’t qualify for housing rent relief. 
4. Housing Rent Relief 
Victims who didn’t stay in temporary housing could apply for housing rent relief 
at USD 93 (NT 3000) per person per month for up to two years. 
5. Discounted Public Housing Sale 
The government provided a 30% discount to help victims buy public housing. 
Victims only needed to contribute USD 3,125 (NT100,000) of the down 
payment. 
6. Employment Service 
Starting Oct 1st, 1999, the Council for Labor implemented a “Working 
Substitutes Relief” policy. Victims could apply for government work for three 
months. Usually this was manual, rather than professional, work that paid USD 
468 (NT 15,000) per month. At first, many victims applied for this program, but 
many quit later because of the low salary. Also, the central government 
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implemented a program to encourage employers to hire victims. These 
employers received USD 156 (NT 5,000) per month from the government to 
subsidize employees’ salaries for a maximum of 12 months.     
7. Medicare Service 
Victims’ health insurance deductible was waived for six months. Moreover, 
victims who received injury relief or relief for collapsed housing had health 
insurance premiums waived for six months. 
8. Tax Deductions and Exemptions 
Victims could apply for income tax deductions for losses caused by the 
earthquake. Victims with collapsed or damaged housing also had land tax and 
housing tax waived for one year. Moreover, the heirs of death victims could 
avoid the inheritance tax if the inheritable deposit in a financial institution was 
less than USD 230,000.  
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9. Housing Reconstruction Loans 
Victims could apply for a no-interest/ low-interest loan from the Central Bank 
through a commercial financial institute for a maximum of USD 109,375 (NT 
3,500,000) for 20 years. The interest would be waived if the amount of the loan 
was less than USD 46,875 (NT 1,500,000) and was assessed at 3% when the 
amount was over this amount. Victims could also postpone paying both the 
principal and interest for the loan on completely collapsed buildings for five 
years (five years for principal and six months for interest for the partially 
collapsed buildings).  
10. Mandatory Military Service Waiver   
Those who were in the mandatory military service could apply for a discharge 
ahead of their scheduled release date if their parents, spouse, brothers, or sisters 
passed away due to the earthquake. Those who had a family death and were 
going into mandatory military service for two years could receive a waiver and 
transfer to the National Guard for only three months. 
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5.4 Factors That Influenced Housing Reconstruction 
Financing was as important a factor influencing housing reconstruction after the 
Chi-Chi Earthquake as it was with the Northridge earthquake. Because only a very 
small percentage of the population had earthquake insurance12, victims’ major funding 
sources were personal savings and public relief/loans (see Figure 5-4). In Asian society, 
the saving rate is usually very high--as high as 26.2% at the time of earthquake (2000, 
Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Taiwan). Therefore, most 
victims used their savings to partially fund housing reconstruction. The survivors also 
could use their death and injury relief or the housing collapse relief for housing 
reconstruction. They could also apply for a low-interest housing reconstruction loan 
from the Central Bank through commercial banks, but many people complained that it 
was difficult to get these low-interest loans because of the mortgage requirement.  
The survivors might choose not to rebuild the collapsed building and move to another 
place. This is what usually happened to condominium victims because of difficulties in 
rebuilding. Considering accessibility to the workplace, the survivors could buy 
commercial housing or discount public housing in a nearby area. According to data 
from the Taiwan Ministry of Interior, only 545 households chose to purchase 
discounted public housing.    
 
 
                                                 
12
 According to the data from Ministry of Finances, Taiwan, less than 2% of the households had 
earthquake insurance in 1999. 
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Figure 5-4 Funding Sources for Housing Reconstruction after Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 
The factors that influenced housing reconstruction in Taiwan are very similar to 
those in the US except for the following two situations that appear to be unique in 
Taiwan: 
1. A shift of the geodetic survey reference points. The quake caused a shift of the 
survey reference points, including the primary reference point in Puli 
Township13. Therefore, collapsed buildings could not be rebuilt before new 
cadastral maps were developed. It took about 18 months to finish making all of 
these new cadastral maps.   
2. The complicated ownership of the land. The ownership of land in Taichung 
County, especially in the mountain area, is very complicated. Some lands are 
                                                 
13
 Puli Township is very near the epicenter of the Chi-Chi earthquake and is only about 50 miles from 
Taichung County  
Funding  
Sources 
Private 
Personal Saving (Large) 
Insurance (Very small) 
Public 
Death and Injury Relief (If used by survivors 
for housing reconstruction) 
Housing Collapse Relief 
Housing Reconstruction Loan from Central 
Bank through Commercial Banks 
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Aboriginal Reserved Land or Forest Experimental Land, but have been occupied 
by people for a long time. Some lands were inherited during the Japanese 
colonial era and their ownership was not clearly recorded. Until ownership was 
established, it was not possible for the residents to be approved to rebuild 
damaged or destroyed structures.    
 
 
5.5 Housing Reconstruction Policies After The Earthquake 
The central government announced 61 special ordinances and programs to speed 
housing reconstruction after the Chi-Chi earthquake. These ordinances can be classified 
into three types: streamlined procedures for housing reconstruction; housing 
reconstruction financial programs; and incentive mechanisms to encourage housing 
reconstruction (see Table 5-2). The policies of streamlining procedures for housing 
reconstruction included expediting building codes, and urban planning and renewal 
procedures. Besides the Housing Collapse Relief and Housing Reconstruction Loans 
that the Central Bank provided through commercial banks, the central government also 
established some policies for housing reconstruction finance such as relief for tearing 
down the totally collapsed buildings and relief from housing design fees. Incentive 
mechanisms that encouraged housing reconstruction included procedures to make new 
cadastral maps in the impact area and the establishment of a real estate ownership 
conflict mediation committee. These 61 housing reconstruction related policies were 
announced from ten days to more than one year after the earthquake. However, most of 
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these policies could have been prepared before the earthquake and adopted at that time 
or immediately after the earthquake. 
 
Table 5-2 Major Policies for Housing Reconstruction after Chi-Chi Earthquake 
Major Policies for Housing Reconstruction Time of Adoption 
Streamline procedure for housing reconstruction 
Expedite building permits 10 days after the earthquake 
Streamline procedure for urban planning  55 days after the earthquake 
Streamline procedure for urban renewal  66 days after the earthquake 
Housing reconstruction financial programs 
Relief for tearing down totally collapsed 
buildings 
140 days after the earthquake 
Relief for housing design fee  183 days after the earthquake 
Relief for farmer’s housing reconstruction 118 days after the earthquake 
Incentive mechanism to encourage housing reconstruction 
Procedure to make new cadastral maps in the 
impact area 
139 days after the earthquake 
Establishment of real estate ownership 
conflict mediation committee 
216 days after the earthquake 
Sources: Collections of Programs and Ordinances for 921 Earthquake Housing 
Reconstruction, 921 Earthquake Post-disaster Recovery Commission, 2002 
  
57
 
5.6 Housing Reconstruction Speed  
Data from Department of Building Regulation, Taichung County (see Table 5-3 and 
Figure 5-5) showed that the peak period of housing reconstruction was between March 
and July 2000, about 7 to 11 months after the earthquake. The peak month was in May 
2000. The line on Figure 5-5 fluctuates during the peak period due to the meeting 
schedule of the building permits review panel. For example, some building permit 
applications submitted in late April were reviewed and issued in May 2000, depending 
on the meeting schedule of the review panel. 
 
Table 5-3 Rebuilding Permits Issued in Taichung County 
Issued Data Cases % Issued Data Cases  % 
Nov-99 271 2.86 May-01 288 3.04 
Dec-99 211 2.23 Jun-01 195 2.06 
Jan-00 403 4.25 Jul-01 215 2.27 
Feb-00 234 2.47 Aug-01 239 2.52 
Mar-00 585 6.17 Sep-01 158 1.67 
Apr-00 424 4.47 Oct-01 178 1.88 
May-00 643 6.78 Nov-01 162 1.71 
Jun-00 457 4.82 Dec-01 202 2.13 
Jul-00 567 5.98 Jan-02 215 2.27 
Aug-00 404 4.26 Feb-02 157 1.66 
Sep-00 347 3.66 Mar-02 201 2.12 
Oct-00 396 4.18 Apr-02 186 1.96 
Nov-00 256 2.70 May-02 213 2.25 
Dec-00 249 2.63 Jun-02 219 2.31 
Jan-01 266 2.81 Jul-02 191 2.02 
Feb-01 275 2.90 Aug-02 9 0.09 
Mar-01 260 2.74 Sep-02 2 0.02 
Apr-01 199 2.10 - - - 
Note: 1. Data for Oct-99 was missing 
 2. Considering the mixing use of the land use pattern in Taiwan such as commercial use in the 
ground floor and residential use in the upper floor, the rebuilding permit data here including the 
residential buildings and commercial buildings. 
Source: Department of Building Regulation, Taichung County 
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Figure 5-5 Percentage of Rebuilding Permits (All Structures) Issued in  
Taichung County 
 
The reconstruction speed for totally collapsed condominium housing was far slower 
than other types of buildings. Table 5-4 shows that condominium reconstruction didn’t 
start until almost one year later than other types of buildings. As of September 2002, 
only about 41% of the total 44 condominiums had been rebuilt or were under 
construction. Difficulty in reaching consensus on reconstruction among condominium 
owners was the most important factor affecting the speed of rebuilding. Moreover, the 
longer it took for the owners to reach consensus, the more difficult it was for them to 
reach agreement. The old ordinance required two thirds of the collapsed-condominium 
owners to agree to rebuild, but it was very difficult to reach this threshold. The central 
government amended this ordinance to lower the threshold from two-thirds to one-half 
almost four months after the earthquake. The 921 Fund Foundation was a semi-official 
organization that accepted worldwide donations right after the Chi-Chi earthquake. This 
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foundation played an important role in condominium housing reconstruction because it 
aimed to solve the problems that the government couldn’t handle in the recovery phase 
due to the budget ordinance. In September 2000, the 921 Fund Foundation started a 
“Nest Building” program to pay the administration fee for the Home Owner’s 
Association for necessary paperwork and procedures. This Foundation also promoted a 
“Jump Start” program in January 2002 to purchase some condominium units to cross 
the agreement threshold of one-half of the owners. The “Jump Start” program has been 
very useful for condominium reconstruction. Table 5-4 shows that the number of 
condominium rebuilding permits issued increased drastically after the inception of this 
program.    
 
Table 5-4 Condominium Rebuilding Permits Issued in Taichung County 
Issued Data Cases Issued Data Cases  
Dec-99 0 May-01 1 
Jan-00 0 Jun-01 0 
Feb-00 0 Jul-01 1 
Mar-00 0 Aug-01 0 
Apr-00 0 Sep-01 0 
May-00 0 Oct-01 0 
Jun-00 0 Nov-01 0 
Jul-00 0 Dec-01 0 
Aug-00 2 Jan-02 0 
Sep-00 1 Feb-02 0 
Oct-00 0 Mar-02 1 
Nov-00 0 Apr-02 0 
Dec-00 0 May-02 2 
Jan-01 0 Jun-02 3 
Feb-01 0 Jul-02 1 
Mar-01 0 Aug-02 2 
Apr-01 0 Sep-02 4 
Source:  921 Earthquake Post-disaster Recovery Commission 
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5.7 Mitigation Issues in Housing Reconstruction  
After the Chi-Chi earthquake, the central government promulgated the Working 
Guidelines for Post-Earthquake Reconstruction Planning on November 9, 1999 (one-
and-a-half months after the earthquake). These guidelines were made by the Council for 
Economic Planning and Development to guide the development of local recovery plans. 
These guidelines mentioned four tasks that needed to be accomplished before making 
recovery plan. These four tasks were the promotion of earthquake-resistant building 
code standards, geology and damage assessment, land survey, and development of a 
damage information database. These guidelines also specified that a recovery plan 
should include an infrastructure recovery plan, an industry recovery plan and a life 
recovery plan. These three plans should overlap with the community recovery plan. The 
local governments, especially the eight township governments in Taichung County, 
finished their recovery plans between March and July of 2000--6 to 10 months after the 
earthquake.  
As mentioned before, local governments relied heavily on support from the central 
government. Many local government officials considered the township recovery plan to 
be a blueprint to request money from the central government. This phenomenon was 
reflected in the content of the township recovery plans, which were very similar to their 
comprehensive development plans. Each township had a vision, such as becoming a 
college town or high technology cit, and expected the central government to invest in its 
plan, but none of these plans mentioned mitigation issues. This situation cannot be 
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blamed entirely on the township government officials; at least two other reasons 
contributed to this situation: 
1. The planners making recovery plans are almost exactly the same group of 
people who made the comprehensive development plans, but unfortunately, 
none of them had any previous experience in making recovery plans. 
2. The central government’s Working Guidelines for Post-Earthquake 
Reconstruction Planning mentioned some mitigation issues in the four tasks 
that needed to done before making the recovery plan and the central 
government agreed to do these tasks. This misled local governments into that 
believing central governments would take care of all the mitigation, so, the 
local governments didn’t consider mitigation to be a part of their 
responsibility during the recovery phase.   
  Instead, the interview data indicated that financial issues and reconstruction speed 
were the major issues for local government. Government officials were under a great 
deal of pressure from victims who wanted to rebuild their housing as soon as possible 
and were especially vulnerable to these demands because a presidential election was 
scheduled for six months after the earthquake. 
  Two mitigation policies were adopted by the central government after the 
earthquake as mentioned in the four tasks on the Working Guidelines for Post-
Earthquake Reconstruction Planning. The first one was to increase the earthquake-
resistant building code standards in the impact area. Taiwan is classified into two 
earthquake-risk zones and the Chi-Chi earthquake impact areas, including Taichung 
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County, were originally in the low risk area which had a less stringent earthquake-
resistant building code. After the earthquake, the central government upgraded the 
impact area to a high risk zone and enforced the higher standard building code 40 days 
after the earthquake. Another mitigation-related policy was to prohibit building along 
the earthquake fault line. Fifty days after the earthquake, the central government 
announced a building moratorium within 50 meters along both sides of the Chi-Chi 
earthquake fault line for 53 days (to the end of year 1999). A new policy establishing a 
permanent building prohibition was announced on Dec 31,1999, but it narrowed the 
distance from 50 meters to 15 meters. The narrowing of this mitigation policy was due 
to the pressure from the victims living in this area and because mitigation issue was no 
longer a focusing event.  
  
63
 
CHAPTER VI    
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1 Pre-impact Recovery Preparedness Plan in Two Study Areas 
In Chapter I, this study concluded that a good pre-impact recovery preparedness 
plan for housing reconstruction should include the following criteria: 
1. Establish agreement about long-term recovery goals, 
2. Establish a task force and leading agency after a disaster, 
3. Let the stakeholders know their roles, 
4. Identify the recovery financing program for which different classes of 
residents are eligible,  
5. Inform people where to find resources after the disaster, and 
6. Make use of the window of opportunity, especially to integrate mitigation 
policies into recovery. 
Using the criteria above to evaluate the situation right before and after the two 
earthquakes shows that (see Table 6-1): 
1. The R& R plan in City of Los Angeles incorporated almost all the six 
criteria except for emphasizing the importance of the window opportunity. 
The City of Los Angeles had developed this plan in response to previous 
disaster experience such as 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake and 1992 
riots. 
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2. After the Northridge earthquake, even though the new city mayor and new 
planning director were unaware of the R& R plan, the City of Los Angeles 
still performed well during the recovery. Thanks to the previous planning 
processes, most of the city departments knew their roles and where to find 
resources. 
3. The Los Angeles case shows that with a good pre-impact recovery plan, the 
recovery organization could function well even if the leadership is not strong. 
4. Lacking any pre-impact recovery preparedness planning, the Taichung 
County government failed to meet the criteria, except that some local 
government officials had personal links with private sources to help with 
post-disaster recovery.  
5. The central government led almost all the recovery policies after the Chi-Chi 
earthquake but the local officials still needed time to learn their new 
responsibilities and adapt national standards to local conditions. 
6. The Taichung case shows that, without a pre-impact recovery plan, the 
recovery will processed slowly even if the upper level of government 
becomes involved and provides resources. 
 
 
 
 Table 6-1 Using Good Pre-impact Recovery Plan Criteria to Examine the Situation  
Immediately Before and After the Two Earthquakes 
LA Taichung Criteria 
Before 
Earthquake 
After 
Earthquake 
Before 
Earthquake 
After 
Earthquake 
Establish agreement about long-term recovery goals    × × 
Establish task force and leading agency after a 
disaster 
  ×  
Let the stakeholders know their roles   × × 
Identify the recovery financing program for which 
different classes of residents are eligible 
  × O 
Inform people where to find resources after the 
disaster 
  O O 
Make use of the window of opportunity to integrate 
mitigation policies into recovery 
  × O 
Note: : Very Great Extent; : Moderate Extent; O: Minimal Extent; ×: Not At All
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6.2 Pre-impact Recovery Preparedness Plan and Housing Reconstruction Speed 
The patterns of housing reconstruction in the City of Los Angeles and Taichiung 
County provide a positive answer for the first hypothesis of this study: Having a pre-
impact preparedness recovery planning appears to increase the speed of housing 
reconstruction. From Figure 6-1, we can see that housing reconstruction in Los Angeles 
peaked about five months earlier than in Taichung County. Table 6-2 shows that the 
central government in Taiwan and the city government in Los Angeles adopted similar 
policies for housing reconstruction, but the adoption time in Taiwan was one week to 
two months later than that in Los Angeles. Moreover, local government officials in 
Taiwan took an even longer time to become familiar with the new policies and their 
implementation procedures. These findings support the first hypothesis that having a 
pre-impact preparedness recovery planning in fact does increase the speed of housing 
reconstruction. 
Moreover, not having a pre-impact preparedness recovery planning makes 
reconstruction policies difficult to implement. The housing collapse relief situation in 
Taiwan provides a good example. Without pre-impact preparedness, it was very 
difficult to mobilize enough structural engineers to investigate damaged structures 
immediately after the earthquake. Therefore, the central government in Taiwan assigned 
elected neighborhood commissioners to investigate the damaged structures and classify 
them as “completely collapsed” or “partially collapsed”, and used that evaluation as the 
basis for determining the amount of housing collapse relief. The neighborhood 
commissioners not only lack professional knowledge to evaluate the collapsed 
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buildings, but they also used very low standards to classify the type of building collapse 
to gain favor in the next election.   
 
Table 6-2 Similar Policies for Housing Reconstruction after the Earthquakes in City  
of Los Angeles and Taiwan 
Post-disaster policies integrated 
into the pre-impact preparedness 
plan in City of Los Angeles 
Equivalent post-disaster 
policies announced after the 
earthquake in Taiwan  
Delay in policy 
adopted in Taiwan 
(Days after the 
earthquake) 
Expedite rebuilding permits Expedite rebuilding permits 10 days  
Review and revise qualifying 
criteria for the city's 
neighborhood revitalization tools 
Streamline procedure for 
urban renewal  
66 days  
Housing recovery financial 
programs from SBA, FEMA, 
HUD etc. 
Housing collapse relief and 
housing reconstruction loans 
etc 
8 to 10 days 
 
 Figure 6-1 Percentage of Rebuilding Permits Issued after Northridge and Chi-Chi Earthquake  
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6.3 Pre-impact Recovery Preparedness Plan and Mitigation Issues 
In its pre-impact recovery preparedness plan, the LA Department of Building and 
Safety had prepared a “retrofit of tilt-ups requirement” ordinance draft which was 
passed by the city council right after the Northridge Earthquake.  Even though hazard 
mitigation is one element of the R&R plan, mitigation policies were still critical for the 
recovery phase.  Most of the federal resources for hazard mitigation were used for 
public buildings or single-family buildings, but those hardest hit were the lower income 
residents living in multifamily buildings.  
Taiwan’s central government’s guideline for a post-disaster recovery plans included 
a mitigation element for local governments after the Chi-Chi earthquake. Since the 
central government didn’t actively promote hazard mitigation during the recovery 
phase, none of the local recovery plans in Taichung County mentioned mitigation. 
Indeed, the only mitigation policy successfully adopted by the central government was 
to enforce more stringent building code standards in the impact area. Another mitigation 
policy to establish a permanent building prohibition zone within 50 meters along the 
both sides of earthquake fault line was later weakened because of local resistance 
The situations in Los Angeles and Taiwan cannot clearly prove that having a pre-
impact recovery preparedness plan increases the extent to which hazard mitigation is 
integrated into the recovery process, but the case of retrofit tilt-ups in Los Angeles 
suggests that having a pre-impact recovery plan makes more effective use of the 
“window of opportunity.” 
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6.4 Conclusion 
Both the Northridge and Chi-Chi earthquakes were the most destructive earthquakes 
in their respective countries in the past half-century. Due to previous disaster 
experience, the City of Los Angeles had developed a unique pre-impact recovery 
preparedness plan before the Northridge earthquake, but no similar plan was made in 
Taiwan before the Chi-Chi earthquake. 
Experiences following these two earthquakes show how pre-impact recovery 
preparedness plans function. Even though there are many differences between these two 
countries in their political and economic contexts, this study suggests that pre-impact 
recovery preparedness plans can speed the recovery process. This study also suggests 
that having a pre-impact recovery plan makes more effective use of the window of 
opportunity for hazard mitigation policy. However, the available data cannot clearly 
support the hypothesis that having a pre-impact recovery preparedness plan increases 
the extent to which hazard mitigation is integrated into the recovery process. The failed 
attempt to establish a prohibited building zone in Taiwan suggests that it is difficult to 
implement mitigation policies after a disaster because of the intense pressure from 
victims who want to rebuild their housing as soon as possible.   
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6.5 Research Limitation 
Since this study is a comparative case study, the result of this study must be 
interpreted cautiously. Because of different political system as well as economic context 
in the two study areas, the result of the first hypothesis can only show the relationship 
between pre-impact recovery plan and housing reconstruction speed, but not the extent 
that pre-impact recovery plan increase or decrease the housing reconstruction speed. 
 
 
6.6 Discussion and Recommendation 
From the housing reconstruction experience following the two earthquakes, this 
study found that most of the recovery financial programs in both countries could be 
more easily obtained by the owners of the single family housings than those of 
multifamily housing. This is because the complicated ownership of condominiums and 
the poor financial situation of apartment owners made them ineligible to apply for 
recovery programs. In fact, the owners of condominiums were more in need of these 
recovery financial programs because most of them were of a lower income class 
compared to owners of signal family housing. The results of this study suggest that 
current recovery financial programs in Taiwan should consider the complicated 
reconstruction process of the condominiums and revise the programs to meet the need 
of these owners.    
 Even though the 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Recovery Commission is still 
functioning, the future of this agency isn’t clear yet. Source of these interviewed 
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believed that this “task-force” type agency will be eliminated after the reconstruction is 
completed. The results of this study suggest that the Taiwanese central government 
should have a specific permanent agency to integrate the entire disaster management 
policy, not just on response (such as Central Hazard Mitigation Council) or recovery 
(such as 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Recovery Commission). Even if a permanent 
agency with an “all functions” mission were established, this can’t guarantee that local 
governments will have pre-impact recovery preparedness plans. Policy adoption is a 
complex process that begins with problem recognition and proceeds to policy 
formulation (Prater & Lindell, 2000). The formulation of pre-impact recovery plans by 
local governments is often facilitated by focusing event such as a disaster. Nonetheless, 
the concept of a pre-impact recovery plan should be promoted by emergency 
management experts and affected stakeholders before the occurrence of focusing event.    
The results of this study also suggest that pre-impact recovery planning in local 
governments should place more emphasis on mutual aid agreements with other 
governments as well as with the private sector. From the experience of reconstruction 
following the Chi-Chi earthquake, local governments themselves did not have many 
resources and heavily relied on helps from central government and the private sector. 
Thus, having mutual aid agreement with other governments and the private sector 
should be an important element in pre-impact recovery planning in Taiwan. 
HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research (1995) found that federal 
mitigation resources were mismatched with the needs, because almost 80% of the 
damage units were multifamily housing, whereas most of the funds were for single-
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family housings or public housings. This study suggests that the federal grants should 
have special hazard mitigation programs aimed at multifamily housings. Moreover, 
current hazard mitigation grants programs should begin to emphasize nonstructural 
mitigation methods. 
 
 
6.7 Suggestions for Future Research 
Because of the different political system and economic contexts in the Los Angeles 
and Taichung County, the study was not able to explain how much the pre-impact 
recovery plan in Los Angeles increases housing reconstruction speed as compared to 
Taichung County. Therefore, it would be a better research to compare two study areas 
that have more similar political and economical conditions.  
The benefits of a pre-impact recovery plan are not only good for housing 
reconstruction. Thus, future studies on how pre-impact recovery plans influence the 
reconstructing of public buildings and infrastructure are also recommended.      
This study shows the importance of making use of the window of opportunity to 
promote hazard mitigation policy. Therefore, studies based on the Kingdon’s (1995) 
window closure theory that attempt to develop strategies to promote hazard mitigation 
will be an important topic. Moreover, the study to examine the duration of the opening 
window by different disaster is also recommended. 
Since almost two-thirds of the housing reconstruction funding is from insurance 
companies, implementing hazard mitigation into earthquake insurance mechanism may 
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be a different way to promote hazard mitigation. Therefore, the study of methods to 
integrate hazard mitigation policies into insurance mechanism is recommend. 
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